The paper gives a critical assessment of the reaction of various trends of economics, when confronted with the diversified experience of postsocialist transformation and accompanying surprises, like the initial depression, the unexpected consequences of fast privatisation, or the unconventional policies and performance of China and Vietnam. It discusses the mainstream transition doctrine, and its gradual qualification, as well as institutionalist and evolutionary approaches of the systemic transformation problems. It concludes that this grand and painful historical experience has until now failed to substantially modify mainstream economics, even though its unfolding has strongly questioned the latter's theoretical and methodological premises.
Introduction
The 20 years that have gone by since the start of the postsocialist transformation, have constituted a unique historical experience of organisational, institutional and systemic change in numerous countries. Such an experience has been a substantial challenge for interpreting and orienting an exceptional and epoch-making process of economic and social transformation. In this paper I propose a succinct survey and assessment of the economists' answers to the great challenge of postsocialism.
This seems all the more valuable a topic given the certainty in the past two decades that there was no alternative to the neo-liberal 'transition' because of the apparent successes of the western economic and business model. Now that this model has been challenged by the current crisis its earlier failings in the postsocialist transition need also to be integrated into any analysis. But this paper also suggests that there has been a resistible process of learning in mainstream economic science and related discussions of business that has limited a proper assessment of its weaknesses.
Transition doctrine and the convergence paradigm
The 1989-1991 period, when communist regimes disappeared and the great postsocialist transformation began, corresponded to a specific context of evolution of economic thought. In the West the neo-liberal and anti-interventionist trend prevailed that had succeeded in gradually outdoing, from the beginning of the 1980s, the synthesis between the neoclassical tradition and the Keynesian doctrine that had been prevalent after the Second World War (Beaud and Dostaler, 1996) . The teaching of Friedman and Hayek had crowded out the declining legacy of Keynes' children. In the East, the crisis (Brus and Laski, 1989) or the conversion (Kornai, 1990 ) of reformist thought accelerated at the end of the period of structural crisis that characterised the last decade of socialist systems (Chavance, 2000a) . Major international organisations, that were going to strongly influence the orientation of transformation policies, represented the essential channels of the period's neo-liberalism. This was specially the case for the 'Washington consensus' established between the IMF, the World Band and the American Treasury, but the OECD and soon the EBRD shared the main orientations, and influential western governments and European community followed as well. The UN organisations such as the economic commission for Europe or the ILO were against the stream, still influenced by the Keynesian tradition, but their impact remained limited. It was against this peculiar background that there emerged what may be called the transition doctrine, that would dominate the first years of system change in the postsocialist world.
The doctrine included multiple influences. There was for example the monetarist view according to which inflation is the greatest of all evils and unemployment constitutes an adjustment variable, that fluctuates around a 'natural rate' depending on structural conditions of the economy; 'rational expectations' of economic agents that thwart the state's intervention drives, upheld by new classical macroeconomics; the belief that demand is secondary (except when it is in excess) shared by supply economics; a quite Hayekian confidence in the self-organisation of the spontaneous order of the market, once the minimal State had been established; the Washington consensus based on the 'holy trinity' of stabilisation-liberalisation-privatisation. But the doctrine's foundations lay in the neoclassical mainstream tradition, with individual rationality, the equilibrium paradigm and concepts of efficiency and optimality of the competitive market. This tradition is based on static allocative efficiency criteria, on an implicitly normative approach that contrasts imperfect historical circumstances to ideal equilibrium states, and on a teleological and deterministic notion of change, understood as a process independent of the path followed.
Schematising the transition doctrine, we had the kind of argument that follows: the final equilibrium state, which was known beforehand, i.e. the 'market economy', strictly determined the most direct and shortest way from the starting point, i.e., the inefficient socialist economy. The transition state being inevitably in disequilibrium, and being prone to backlashes, should be shortened as much as possible. The fast nature of change was consequently deemed essential. As for the means of change, they were free of any ambiguity too. Stabilisation would eliminate any perverse consequences of inflation, privatisation would create correct incentives for economic agents and liberalisation would allow competition to accomplish the necessary 'creative destruction' of industries and enterprises bequeathed by the old system. A new disciplinary field, transition economics, was thus formed by extending mainstream economic theory to this new domain. It revealed an unprecedented form of the theory of systems convergence, especially as international organisations, being influent actors in the process of change, spontaneously embraced a global and uniform approach of transition in about 25 countries. The strategy was consequently regarded as straightforward and, in the same manner as for earlier structural adjustment plans, it had to be the same for all.
Institutionalist critiques and the evolutionary approach
In reaction to the initial hegemony of the transition doctrine, that was felt particularly among international organisations and among western economists involved in advising the new governments (while being less hegemonic in the academic world), different authors or trends of thought criticised the finalist approach and the big bang thesis, stressing the importance of institutions and the evolutionary character of economic change in general. While neo-liberal and neoclassical references were fundamental in the transition doctrine, the camp of criticism appeared more pluralistic, it included various heterodox trends (as institutionalist or post-Keynesian economists, or economic sociologists) but also authors linked to the Austrian tradition, to new institutional economics or to information economics (these two theories themselves deriving from the neoclassical tradition).
The different critical stances generally shared a refusal to forget history, and scepticism of the wisdom of searching speed at all costs. While the transition mainstream appeared as fixated on the final state and, in some cases, as advocating a tabula rasa as a complement to shock therapy and mass privatisation, institutionalist analyses stressed the legacy of the past, the dangers of voluntaristic revolutionary upheavals, and generally argued for gradualism in the field of institutional change, as well as for more or less state intervention in the transformation process. A new controversy between 'teleologists' and 'geneticists' seemed to occur, ironically echoing the debate that had taken place in the Soviet Union around 1930. The new emergence of long term historical trends was consequently stressed (Berend, 1996) , as was the influence of the last period of socialist systems (Kornai, 1990; Murre1l, 1993; Poznanski, 1995; Chavance and Magnin, 1996) , and the possibility of various political 'extrication paths' away from the communist regimes (Stark, 1992) . Some economists, following the Austrian tradition, criticised the 'constructivist' error that lay in the attempt to construct capitalism in fashion symmetrical to the earlier construction of socialism. North (1994) stressed that the change in formal institutions raised no special difficulty, but that the mainstream approach neglected the inertia of informal institutions, that explained that the actual evolution differed from initial expectations.
A frequent theme in the anti-finalist theories was the importance of the process concept as opposed to that of equilibrium. Change was understood as a process that occurs in historical time, where circular and cumulative causalities are at work, where irreversible alterations materialise and where there are plenty of surprises and unexpected developments. Emergent phenomena were deemed critical. In these approaches the less deterministic term of 'transformation' was often preferred to the conventional idea of 'transition', or the latter was simply used in the very general sense of the systemic shift from socialism to capitalism (Kornai, 1999; Chavance, 2003) .
Institutionalist theories have often underlined the way that the Chinese experience has called into question the transition doctrine. In China, a protracted reform process, based on a pragmatic attempt of the unreformed communist regime to accelerate economic modernisation, gradually induced a process of cumulative systemic change, associated with a high and sustained growth and an exceptional increase in income per head and a decrease of absolute poverty. The Chinese strategy was a kind of antithesis to the Washington consensus, and the trajectory followed by this country conflicted with the main theses of the mainstream, like those of the unsustainable character of any reform of the socialist system, the perversity of gradual change, the necessity to open the economy and to shift to convertibility at one stroke, the priority that has to be given to privatisation and the extension of financial markets, the inevitability of a 'transformational recession', etc. (Chavance, 2000b) .
Transformation surprises
Frequent unexpected developments, or 'transition surprises', called into question the arrogant self-confidence of the initial transition doctrine. Such prediction failures should not, as a matter of fact, represent a problem when addressing extraordinary and wide-scale transformations such as a system change. However, the positivist methodology tradition of economic science regards correct predictions -as opposed to realistic hypotheses -as the genuine test of a theory's scientific nature. The most troublesome surprise was that of 'transformational recession' (Kornai) or, to eschew understatement, the 'great postsocialist depression', that struck all transition countries. The expected 'supply response' appeared everywhere to be negative rather than positive in the first years that followed stabilisation and liberalisation. Another significant surprise was the industrial collapse of the former East Germany, even though the country benefited from a wholesale institutional transfer and from a massive and protracted financing from West Germany's state budget. Chavance (2003) Problems and delays in the privatisation process appeared as another disturbing trend. Mass privatisation programs in the Czech Republic and in Russia were successes in terms of speed, but caused worrisome arrangements in the field of ownership distribution and of corporate governance; privatisation legitimacy was strongly questioned in the Russian case. In many countries a trend observed after privatisation was the extension of ownership by the members of the enterprise, either employees or managers, -a suspect outcome in the eyes of mainstream economics. Banking or financial crises occurred (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Russia). A striking variety of macroeconomic and institutional paths of change became apparent, and emergent national forms of postsocialist capitalism revealed markedly different patterns. If we take a more comprehensive outlook, the diverging trajectories of Central European economies and of Russia and Ukraine became increasingly manifest (see Table 1 ). In these two countries, the weakening of the state, the extension of barter, the role of mafias in significant parts of the economy, as well as substantial increase in inequalities and poverty, contrasted with the revival of growth and the relative capacity of the state in Central European countries. During the same period, China and Vietnam sustained their path of gradual and cumulative reforms (contrary to economic mainstream prescriptions) under communist rule, and experienced high growth, external opening and an increase in the average standard of living, in spite of the expansion of inequalities. Some unexpected political events also took place during the 1990s, like the electoral comeback of former communist parties that had been converted into social-democratic parties; a further surprise was that they did not reverse the strategy of transition to capitalism nor economic policies followed until then, but rather maintained them by and large. By the late 2000s, a moderate assessment of the transition doctrine would have the following characteristics:
! the case of Central Europe and the Baltic states is controversial: some think it has vindicated the mainstream approach, others believe that it has proved it false; we see an example of such a dispute in the paradigmatic case of Poland (see for example Balcerowicz, 1995; Kolodko, 2000) ! the case of Russia was such a massive failure (Sapir, 1998 (Sapir, , 1999 , that even the former director of IMF, Michel Camdessus, was forced to acknowledge it ! with China, the transition doctrine was faced with an aberrant experience in contradiction to its paramount principles, an experience that contrasted in a favourable manner on important economic dimensions with the rest of the postsocialist world.
The qualified doctrine
In the second half of the 1990s, it became difficult for its exponents to sustain the initial approach, taking into account the various and unexpected developments that had taken place in the process of system change, and also the criticisms addressed to this perspective, that frequently put it into question. A harsh critique of the Washington consensus, as applied to transition, was even made by the chief economist of the World Bank (Stiglitz, 1998 (Stiglitz, , 2000 1 . Qualifications and shades of meanings were thus introduced in the transition doctrine, often integrating heterodox ideas about the role of the state and the law, the importance of institutions, the actual diversity of national trajectories of change, the concern for the social dimension of systemic change, for its political legitimacy, etc. Sometimes the dividing line between the mainstream approach and its institutionalist or evolutionary opponents became somewhat blurred. But most of the time, changes remained limited.
In some cases, alterations in the doctrine remained utterly superficial. This was specially observed in international organisations, that have displayed an astonishing capacity to neutralise the ideas of their critics -a tendency being also observed about objections to the neo-liberal globalisation. In the EBRD (European bank for reconstruction and development) Transition report 2000, we could read, for instance, that 'one important lesson of the past decade has been that there is no unique process or 'time-line' of transition from central planning under communism to a unique, easily identifiable, familiar form of market capitalism under democratic political institutions.(...) It seems a safe prediction that most of the EBRD's countries of operation will develop their own distinct brand of capitalism' [EBRD, (2000), pp.3-4] . Following this enlightened statement, the report proceeded to examine extensively the EBRD 'transition indicators', that have been the main instrument to measure per annum the country-specific progress, since 1994, under different dimensions (percentage of private sector in GDP, price liberalisation, reform of banking and financial institutions, ...), on a scale between 1 and 4+. National economies consequently appeared explicitly as more or less advanced or behind time on this one-directional scale 2 . What remained to be explained was how to reconcile the previous 'lesson' with such teleological and normative approach of the final convergence toward a terminal equilibrium state.
We see here a caricature example of the amended transition doctrine, that pays lip service to alternative views without altering its basic axioms. A genuine comparative analysis of the process of systemic transformation in different countries was therefore ruled out. Interdependencies between diverse modes of institutional or organisational change, that generate 'specific varieties of capitalism' remained concealed. Moreover, the lack of systemic analysis hindered the comprehension of the fact that alleged virtue in one dimension may have been associated with perversity in another dimension (for instance, the advance of privatisation that was linked to financial fragility).
This kind of approach was even more overly simplistic than the old unilinear theory of the 'stages of growth' (Rostow, 1960) , that assumed a single pre-established path for any national trajectory of modernisation, but which at least considered different qualitative phases in such process.
Transition doctrine, in its original or qualified form, insisted on success stories, that were held to illustrate beneficial consequences of its approach. Alas, such stories were frequently modified or reversed, resulting in astonishing turnarounds -the causes of which were seldom precisely explained. First, there was Poland with its commendable shock therapy (Sachs, 1993) , that experienced an unexpectedly slow privatisation and a surprising return of reformed communists to the government; there was the valiant neo-liberal attempt of Russia, that received immoderate praise of many experts (Aslund, 1995; Layard and Parker, 1996; Boycko et al., 1995) and that culminated in a massive disaster (Sapir, 1998) ; there was the 'Czech miracle' (good macroeconomic performance, accelerated privatisation, low unemployment) that was reversed after 1997 and became the very illustration of what ought to be avoided… At the same time, great efforts were made to evade any comparison between the apparently paradoxical experiences of China (and Vietnam) , and the evolution of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, or to downplay their unconventionality, and to predict their inevitable future 'convergence' with Eastern Europe (Sachs and Woo, 1994, 2000) . The drive for a quick legitimation of current policies, the lack of historical and comparative analysis and the focus on short term changes are tendencies deeply rooted in the dominant tradition of economic thought and policies.
Limits of evolutionary theories: ruptures and futurity
Institutionalist theories in economics generally emphasise change as an evolution process and the role of cumulative causation (Hodgson, 1999) . Importance given to time sequences, to actual continuities that sometimes predominate over historical breaks, the stress they put on interdependent partial changes in emergent processes, have given to their critique of the transition doctrine a patent accuracy. Nonetheless, these theories have been essentially developed to analyse incremental and progressive changes: they face here their own limits in interpreting systemic disruptions like postsocialist transformation (or, symmetrically, the initial formation of socialist systems). They often lack a concept of crisis, or a concept of revolution (as opposed to the concept of evolution). While dealing with mutations, innovations, -they generally do not examine the structural remaking of large economic systems. The Schumpeterian tradition may be more relevant to deal with such revolutions, from a technological or organisational point of view. But what is lacking here is a concept of institutional and organisational revolution as an integral part of an evolutionary theory of economic change (see Dockès, 1998) .
It is essential to stress that the weight of the past has often been underscored in the mainstream approach, as the institutionalist analyses of path dependency have rightly shown (Stark and Bruszt, 1998) . It remains the case, however, that the role of anticipations, of futurity (to quote J.R. Commons' term) has often been revealed as critical in actual transformation trajectories. The path shaping (i.e., opening a new course) character of anticipations (Hausner et al., 1995) , or the role of 'anticipated institutions' (Federowicz, 1995) , (understandably stressed by Polish researchers), in other words individual or collective actions based on futurity, should not be forgotten in understanding national pathways of transformation, have they been perverse, positive or even virtuous at times. While calling into question the approach focused on equilibrium and the final state, emphasis should be put on such elements. Postsocialist systemic change implies that specific parts of the national economic system, their interdependencies and reciprocal relations, the system as a whole as its distinct essence, and even the environment of the system, are all transformed in a rather condensed historical period. In such temporality, individual and collective action faces a new kind of uncertainty, systemic uncertainty. While individuals and organisations often fall back on habits or established routines, on behaviours or relations previously learned, they also turn to anticipations of the emergent order, or to short term opportunities. Such anticipations have creative consequences, often unexpected, sometimes self-fulfilling.
Another aspect of the legacies of the past is their ambivalence. Some play a role of constraints for accelerated change, others on the contrary facilitate transformation. Some have detrimental consequences, others have beneficial effects, such duality appearing differently according to the individual or social actors. Any assessment of this complex and changing role of the legacies of the past must take into account the 'historical specificity' of a national or regional transformation path, and the role of contingent events -rightly stressed by the path dependency approach. This raises a methodological problem with reference to a general theory of transition. Various generalisations have been attempted in this direction, but they are often questionable as they may be refuted by one or more national counter-examples. If one wishes to draw 'general lessons' of the transformation process as it has occurred until now, the challenge of the diversity of national experiences has to be confronted, and one has to undertake an inductive analysis of the variety of national trajectories; mainstream economics is not well prepared to such an exercise, being strongly inclined to hypothetical-deductive analysis. Without such inductive moment in research, there is a serious risk of unsound generalisation made on the basis of a partial experience or of a limited period, without taking into account historical specificity as a necessary constituent of a general theorisation (Hodgson, 2001 ).
Conclusions
Postcommunist experience has indeed challenged the different trends of economic thought but, as a matter of fact, it did not result in a paradigm revolution. A conceptual change that took place since 1989 has nonetheless been the return of the concept of institution. It would be difficult to find today a theoretical school that would not agree that institutions matter for economics. The title of the World Development Report 2002 of the World Bank was building institutions for markets -which was initially an exclusively institutionalist and minority theme 3 . In the field of economics however, the mainstream when confronted to critics has developed numerous protective or neutralising tactics -as may be seen in the case of neo-liberal globalisation. The irony is that such methods to avoid criticism, particularly the one that refers to historical experience, are used by a tradition that advocates in the abstract the Popperian refutability as a standard of scientificity in the field of methodology; but it fails to apply it to itself.
The dominant tradition in economics retains hegemony after a historical experience that actually appeared quite cruel for it (not to mention the societies where its influence was imposed). But economics is a discipline that has a specific relation with politics and power relations; in addition, its mainstream has deliberately divorced from other social sciences one century ago. This state of affairs may not be eternal; but time will be needed, and perhaps also other painful historical episodes like the great capitalist crisis of the late 2000s for economics to assimilate such complex experiences and to genuinely theorise them. It will also depend much on dissident trends and their capacity to illustrate the authentic status of economics as a discipline: not a quasi 'hard' science emancipated from social sciences (or trying to colonise them), but a region or a sector of the social science.
